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ANTITRUST LAW
PAUL J. GALANTI*
During the past term, the Seventh Circuit decided several cases involv-
ing interesting aspects of antitrust law. However, none of these cases can be
considered earth-shattering, and perhaps the introductory statement should
be qualified since later discussion will show the court did not have to decide
all of the issues it raised and discussed.'
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis; J.D.,
University of Chicago.
1. The court, of course, cannot be faulted for exercising judicial self-restraint and
not deciding issues not essential to a particular case. However, this writer is sure judges
enjoy the opportunity to engage in legal discourses without having to make an ultimate
determination.
Although this article will discuss three Seventh Circuit decisions, there are other
cases decided by the court that warrant at least a passing reference. One such case is
Coming Glass Works v. FTC, 509 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'g and enforcing
Coming Glass Works, 3 TRADE REG. REP. § 20,352 (F.T.C. 1973) noted in 43 FoRD. L.
REV. 1026 (1975). The court upheld the Commission's decision invalidating a clause in
Coming's form wholesaler contract requiring wholesalers in states without fair trade
laws to refuse to sell to retailers in fair trade states who had not agreed to maintain
Coming's fair trade prices. The court agreed that the antitrust exemption provided by
section 2 of the McGuire Act, 66 Stat. 632 (1952), amending section 5 of the FTC Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2) (1970), did not encompass this type of vertically imposed resale
price maintenance. Consequently the clause was unlawful as an unfair method of
competition under section 5. The exemption is available only where a state, territory, or
the District of Columbia has a statute, law or public policy authorizing resale price
agreements for commodities under certain circumstances. See generally 1 R. CALLMANN,
UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §§ 22.2, 24, 25.1 (3d ed. 1967).
The primary issue in the case was whether the law of the state of the wholesaler
who is the immediate vendee of the fair trading manufacturer or that of the state of a
subsequent purchaser from the wholesaler determined the legality of a price maintenance
program. The court held it was the former and hence in the so called "free trade" states
no restrictions could be imposed on wholesalers even where the subsequent purchaser was
in a fair trade state. A retailer in a so called "non-signer" fair trade jurisdiction, a
jurisdiction that enforces fair trade against all sellers whether or not they have contract-
ed with the manufacturer, would still have to sell at the fixed price. However, retailers
in "signer only" jurisdictions, those that enforce fair trade only against sellers contracting
with the manufacturers, could purchase the merchandise at competitive prices out of state
and undercut competitors bound by fair trade agreements. Needless to say a restriction
prohibiting wholesalers from selling to fair trade state retailers was critical to Coming's
price maintenance program, and when it was invalidated Coming's response was to
abandon fair trade. N.Y. Times, April 8, 1975, at 46, col. 6.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
The result in Corning hinged on the meaning of the word "resale" as used in both
the McGuire Act and the earlier Miller-Tydings Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), amending
section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The court concluded that the
clause in the McGuire Act permitting agreements requiring vendees to limit resales to
persons agreeing to maintain fair trade prices did not change the meaning of "resale" in
the clause determining the lawfulness of such programs, and that the "when lawful"
clause still referred to the state of the first resale by the immediate vendee of the fair
trading manufacturer.
Corning involved an interesting exercise in statutory construction that might possi-
bly have done some violence to the congressional intent behind the fair trade exemption,
see Note, 43 FOn. L. REV., supra, at 1034-36, but as Professor Milton Handler
observed in one of his excellent antitrust lectures the courts have demonstrated hostility
to the underlying premises of fair trade and have pointedly ignored the proposition that
it is for the legislatures and not the courts to pass on the wisdom, merit and utility of fair
trade. 1 M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 516-22 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as HANDLER].
The Corning decision was significant enough, in this writer's judgment, to warrant
an extensive discussion in the earlier stages of this article. However, the issue was for
all intents and purposes mooted when the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, H.R.
6971, was signed into law on December 12, 1975. The Act repeals the exemptions
provided by both the McGuire and the Miller-Tydings Acts and when it becomes
effective on March 11, 1976, fair trade agreements will be subject to the long established
proscription against resale price maintenance that obtained before the fair trade exemp-
tions were passed and still applies to programs that do not satisfy the requirements of the
exemption. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Of course even
without the Pricing Act the days of fair trade probably were numbered as more and more
jurisdictions repealed their fair trade acts, fifteen alone in 1975, 2 CCH TRADE REG.
REP. § 6041, or had non-signer statutes turned into signer-only statutes by judicial decree
invalidating such statutes on state constitutional grounds, see, e.g., Corning Glass Works
v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354, 361-63 (Mass. 1973), reducing the jurisdictions
that permit fair trade in either form to twenty-one. This is from a high of forty-six. See
ABA ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 DEVELOP-
MENTS].
Another decision of the Seventh Circuit worth noting is Bob Layne Contractor, Inc.
v. Bartel, 504 F.2d 1293 (7th Cir. 1974), affirming a summary judgment against plaintiff
real estate developer. In 1960 Layne platted a subdivision in Muncie, Indiana, and
recorded certain restrictions, conditions and limitations limiting the lots to single family
residences. However, a later taking of land for highway construction made 49 lots more
suitable for commercial than for residential development. Layne was able to have the
plat vacated in part but his efforts to have the property rezoned were frustrated by legal
action of a neighborhood Citizens Association. Layne's suit alleged that a contributor to
that group had commercial interests giving the efforts an anticompetitive cast. In
affirming the court concluded the evidence showed the contributions were not motivated
by an anticompetitive purpose and that in any event the attempt by citizens to influence
zoning matters was protected under Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The Noerr-Pennington-Trucking Unlimited doctrine
is the basis of Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc. 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir.
1975) discussed at note 5 infra and accompanying text.
Efforts to apply the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(f) (1970), to
matters outside the jurisdictional grant failed in Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,
505 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1974). Plaintiffs urged that the brokerage provision, section
2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1970), applied to rebates title insurance companies paid to
savings and loan associations and other agents authorized to purchase title insurance for
property owners. The district court dismissed the complaint holding that section 2(c)
applies only to "goods, wares or merchandise" and not to the sale of intangibles such as
title insurance. Although there is countless authority that the Act is limited to
transactions involving tangibles, Baum v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 409 F.2d 872
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THE Noerr-Pennington-Trucking Unlimited DOCTRINE
An interesting decision in the Noerr2- Pennington3- Trucking Unlimited4
(7th Cir. 1969), plaintiffs argued that section 2(c) applied because it provides "except
for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods .. ." (emphasis
added). This legalistic legerdemain with punctuation was rejected by the court which
noted that judicial repunctuation will be permitted if necessary to effect legislative intent.
This of course is particularly appropriate when dealing with the Robinson-Patman Act.
See Galanti, Buyer Liability for Inducing or Receiving Discriminatory Prices, Terms,
and Promotional Allowances: Caveat Emptor in the 1970's, 7 IND. L. REV. 962 (1974).
A second tack of the Freeman plaintiffs, as untenable as the first, was that section
2(c) applied because the title report was a tangible, physical document. The court
rightly pointed out that the transfer of any intangible rarely can be accomplished without
the incidental involvement of documents or other tangibles and that premising jurisdic-
tion on a mere piece of paper would clearly extend the Act to transactions not
contemplated by Congress. See, e.g., Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. United Press
Int'l, Inc., 369 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1966). A third argument was that the language
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012-13 (1970), applying the Clayton
Antitrust Act to the insurance industry to the extent it is not regulated by state law in
effect applied the Robinson-Patman Act to the industry whether or not that statute
applied according to its terms. The court rejected this argument recognizing that
the McCarran-Ferguson Act was intended to restore the "status quo ante," United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533 (1944) and not to expand the
Robinson-Patman Act. A final contention that a decision in a government merger
action against Chicago Title resulted in collateral estoppel as far as section 2(c) also
was to no avail. The court noted that the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 2601-16 (1975) might solve the problem, although it was not yet law at the
time and it might not be law when this is published as it has engendered considerable
dissatisfaction. See Bus. WEEK, Oct. 13, 1975, at 40; 33 CONG. QTLY. 2233 (Oct. 18,
1975); 33 CONG. QTLY. 2524 (Nov. 22, 1975).
A fourth case of passing antitrust interest is Arenson v. Chicago Merchantile
Exchange, 520 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1975). Arenson involved plaintiffs' motion to hold
the Board of Trade and other defendants in contempt for violating a settlement order
entered in several consolidated antitrust actions brought against commodity exchanges
and their members challenging the exchanges' minimum commission rates members
charge non-members for commodity transactions. The settlement order contemplated
competitively set rates after a transition period where the exchanges could prescribe and
enforce minimum rates. During that period the exchanges could increase minimum rates
in effect on November 1, 1972, only with court approval.
The particular dispute was over an "exchange service fee" the Board of Trade
imposed on transactions for non-members with the fees to be used for purposes
benefiting the non-members. The district court judge who had approved the settlement
agreement denied plaintiffs' motion, holding that the exchange service fee was just that,
and not an increase in the minimum commission rates that would have violated the
settlement order. He noted that the fees were imposed in order to defray operating
expenses of the Board of Trade and non-members fees were collected by members simply
as a matter of convenience. The Seventh Circuit was reluctant to disturb the district
court's rejection of the argument that the agreement was intended to prohibit any
increase in rates whether "commission rates or rates by any other name" and the
acceptance of defendants' argument that the original order was limited by its express
terms. The court concluded that the interpretation of the settlement order was reasona-
ble and that the denial of the motion was not an abuse of discretion.
2. Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961).
3. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
4. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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area is Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc.5 Metro operated a
cable television transmission system in the rural areas around Rockford,
Illinois. It picked up television signals from commercial stations in Rock-
ford and elsewhere and transmitted them to subscribers. 6 The genesis of the
suit was Metro's inability to obtain a franchise from Rockford to construct
and operate a cable system beyond its existing service area. The suit was
against the company that obtained the franchise (CATV), an affiliate that
operated a commercial TV channel in Rockford whose signals were picked up
by Metro, certain individuals who were principals of the two corporations,
and the Mayor and an alderman of Rockford. The district court 7 granted
defendants' motion to dismiss, basing its action on Noerr - Pennington, and
the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The complaint apparently was not a model of clarity8 but its gist was
that the defendant corporations and corporate personnel conspired among
themselves and with the two city officials to prevent Metro from obtaining
the requisite municipal authority to operate a cable system within Rockford. 9
Their goal was to preserve a CATV monopoly in the area for the corporate
defendants and apparently to foreclose Metro from entering the Rockford
television market in any way.10 The two city officials purportedly used
their best efforts to frustrate Metro's successive attempts to obtain a fran-
chise, or even to obtain a hearing on the merits of its several proposals, and
to award the franchise to CATV. The quid pro quo was the promise of
substantial campaign contributions."
5. 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
6. There is no question but that Cable TV plays a significant role in furnishing
competition to existing television operations. Pearson, a staff attorney with the antitrust
section of the Justice Department, in his article Cable: The Thread By Which Television
Competition Hangs, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 800 (1974), posits that television broadcasting
and programming is too heavily concentrated in a few sources both on the national and
local level and that if existing restrictions were removed cable television could signifi-
cantly increase competition in the industry.
7. 375 F. Supp. 350 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
8. 516 F.2d at 222-23 nn.2,3. The complaint was summarized by the district
court, 375 F. Supp. at 352-56.
9. Illinois statutes authorize municipal authorities to "license" or "franchise" cable
systems. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-42-11 (1973). The Metro Cable court noted that
although the terms are used interchangeably, franchise more appropriately described the
authority. 516 F.2d at 228 n.12.
10. The court ultimately acknowledged that a distant television station that could
reach Rockford consumers only through cable television might have a valid antitrust
claim if the defendants' conspiracy delayed implementation of such a system. However
Metro itself was not injured in its business or property by that conduct. 516 F.2d at
232-33. This demonstrates the court's awareness that Noerr-Pennington does not
immunize all aspects of a scheme that might in part involve an effort to influence
governmental action. See Semke v. Enid Automobile Dealers Ass'n., 456 F.2d 1361,
1370 (10th Cir. 1972), a post-Trucking Unlimited decision where the court stated that
only "injuries and damages proven to have resulted from conspiracies other than those
related to petitioning and obtaining official state action need be tried."
11. The substantial contribution point appears to be pleaders' hyperbole. The
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Metro characterized these activities as an unlawful boycott or concerted
refusal to deal in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act1 2 and
as monopolization and a conspiracy to monopolize in violation of section 2.13
district court said the sum was $50. 375 F. Supp. at 357 n.2. The second amended
complaint toned down the earlier pleadings, 516 F.2d at 222, but Metro was not
demonstrating the paranoia oft shown by unsuccessful applicants. In April 1966 the
Rockford City Council's License Committee recommended that Metro be granted a cable
franchise, but this was overruled nine days later when the franchise was awarded to
CATV. A second application was made in 1970 -but it did not even receive a hearing.
This application was supported by an opinion of counsel that Rockford could not grant
an exclusive franchise. A third application was submitted in 1971 and even though an
assistant city attorney opined that Rockford had no right to grant an exclusive franchise
to CATV the City Council again refused to hold a hearing. Subsequently, the alderman
defendant who chaired the Council's Planning and Finance Committee appointed himself
to a subcommittee to establish hearing procedures for awarding a second franchise. This
subcommittee allegedly decided to do nothing and to allow only CATV to operate. In
1972 the alderman defendant voted not to grant additional cable television franchises in
Rockford. The mayor allegedly filed a false certificate with the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to the effect that public proceedings were held as required by FCC
regulations when such was not the case. Metro's 1972 request for authority to traverse
the city with a cable to reach subscribers in unincorporated areas also failed supposedly
because of the efforts of the municipal defendants and a misrepresentation by a corporate
officer defendant. 516 F.2d at 223-24.
12. 15 U.S.C § 1 (1970). Section 1 provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal ....
Concerted refusals to deal have long been characterized as per se offenses under section
1. See, e.g., Klor's v. Broadway Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See
generally 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 16-19; 16, 16G, 16J J. VON KALINOWSKI,
BUSINESS ORoAIZATIONS § 6.02[2][c], 60.02, 76.01-04 (1975) [hereinafter cited as VON
KALiNowsKi].
The district court, 375 F. Supp. at 359, characterized the complaint as merging a
boycott charge with a charge that Metro was foreclosed from the Rockford market. It
further opined that there was no "boycott" since the city had not refused to buy from or
sell to Metro but had just declined to grant it authority to do business.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). Section 2 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor ....
The offense of monopolization is generally defined as the possession of monopoly or
market power in the economic sense coupled with an element of deliberateness or
generalized intent to obtain, use or maintain that power. See, e.g., United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Corp. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1945). See generally REPORT OF THE ArrORNEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAwS 43-60 (1955) [herein-
after cited as 1955 REPORT]; 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, note 1 supra, at 47-59; 16 VON KAL-
INOWSKI, note 12 supra, §§ 3.03[2], 8.01-.02. Monopolization was the gist of the action
in Cass Student Advertising Inc. v. National Educ. Advertising Serv., Inc., 516 F.2d 1092
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3295 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1975), discussed at note
84 infra, and accompanying text. A conspiracy to monopolize is a separate offense
under section 2 wherein the combination helps satisfy the deliberateness element.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). See generally 1955
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Metro also alleged that the cross-ownership and close affiliation of the two
corporate defendants constituted an independent violation of the antitrust
laws. This element of the complaint was rejected by the district court
because the relationship of the defendants could not by itself constitute an
antitrust violation. Rather it is the effect of such relationships that deter-
mines the legality. 1 4  In the instant case it was not the affiliation that
affected Metro but the inability to obtain the governmental franchise.
Therefore, defendants' efforts to influence the City of Rockford to their
advantage and Metro's harm were, to both the district court and the Seventh
Circuit, immune from antitrust attack under the Noerr - Pennington -
Trucking Unlimited line of cases.
Both courts appear to be absolutely correct in so characterizing the suit
since Metro Cable falls squarely within Noerr. Noerr involved a particular-
ly vicious battle between railroads and longhaul trucking interests that had
entered the political sphere when the railroads sought state governmental
action, both executive and legislative, that would injure the truckers. The
lower courts held that the efforts constituted a Sherman Act violation. The
Supreme Court,15 in a unanimous opinion by Justice Black, reversed,
holding that concerted action to induce or influence public officials to pass or
enforce laws is not forbidden by the antitrust laws notwithstanding any
REPORT, supra, at 61-62; 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 59-60; 16A voN
KA&LiowsKJ, supra note 12, § 9.02. Again the district court observed that Metro had
obfuscated its market concept by using allegations expressed in terms of the Rockford
CATV market in connection with a purpose to foreclose Metro from the general
television market. 375 F. Supp. at 359-60 n.8. The Seventh Circuit did not really
discuss the merits of Metro's complaint because of its decision on the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine.
14. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951); United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947). See generally HANDLER, supra note 1, at
1047-49; 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 31-34; 16 VON KA LNOWSKI, supra
note 12, §§ 6.01[2][c], 6.01[3].
15. 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1957); 166 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa. 1958), a/I'd,
273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'd, 365 U.S. 127 (1961). See generally 16F VON
KALINOWSKI, supra note 12, § 46.04. Not surprisingly Noerr, and its progeny, Penning-
ton and Trucking Unlimited, have generated considerable academic comment. Trucking
Unlimited was particularly bountiful since there really is a dispute whether it made
inroads into the original Noerr doctrine. See, e.g., I & 2 HANDLER, supra note 1, at
417-20, 1017-30; 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 410-11; Costilio, Antitrust's
Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MicH. L. REV. 333 (1967);
Jacobs, Regulated Motor Carriers and the Antitrust Laws, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 90
(1972); Oppenheim, Antitrust Immunity for Joint Efforts to Influence Adjudication
Before Administrative Agencies and Courts-From Noerr to Trucking Unlimited, 29
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 209 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Oppenheim]; Note, The
Quagmire Thickens: A Post-California Motor View of the Antitrust and Constitutional
Ramifications of Petitioning the Government, 42 U. CN. L. REV. 281 (1973); Com-
ment, Antitrust Immunity: Recent Exceptions to the Noerr-Pennington Defense, 12 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REv. 133 (1971); Note, Application of the Sherman Act to Attempts to
Influence Governmental Action, 81 HRv. L. REv. 847 (1968),
ANTITRUST LAW
anticompetitive purpose, intent or effect and notwithstanding that the efforts
could be characterized as politically unethical. The Court started from the
premise that restraints of trade resulting from otherwise valid governmental
action do not violate the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown.16 Starting
with Parker and acknowledging the importance in a representative democra-
cy of the right to petition to induce governmental action Noerr concluded
that genuine efforts to induce lawful government actions were not intended
to be covered by the Sherman Act. This result logically follows Parker
because it would be somewhat anomalous if California raisin growers had
been held liable for inducing the proration orders involved in that case while
California officials could adopt regulations affecting competition in the raisin
industry with Sherman Act immunity.
The Noerr court viewed the Sherman Act as applying -to commercial
agreements inhibiting "trade freedom" and not to agreements to seek
legislation or law enforcement. The distinction could be inferred from the
dissimilar nature of the two kinds of agreements, confirmed by the effect a
contrary construction of the Sherman Act would have on the operation of a
representative democracy. The government would be impaired in its right,
or actually its need, to have input from the citizenry including vested
interests in making political decisions. The corollary right of the citizenry to
petition -the government also would be impaired, raising serious constitutional
questions.' 7 Noerr was not decided on constitutional grounds, although
Justice Douglas raised it to that status in the later Trucking Unlimited's
decision, but rather the Court was utilizing first amendment considerations as
indicias or guides to congressional intent.' 9 The Court can be commended
for its concern with the right to petition, but it is possible to posit that a
contrary decision in Noerr would not have been all that detrimental. Simply
put, a rule that competitors can not join together to influence governmental
action certainly would not proscribe individual efforts by the railroads in
Noerr or by members of any other competitive group to seek favorable
treatment. 20
16. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See also United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U.S.
533 (1939). The doctrine actually dates back to Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908
(D.S.C. 1895). See generally 2 HANDLER, supra note 1, at 909-30; 1975 DEVELOP-
MENTS, supra note 1, at 406-09; 16F VON KALunowsK, supra note 12, § 46.03.
17. See 365 U.S. at 132 n.6, 139.
18. 404 U.S. 508 (1972). Justice Douglas at one point in the opinion character-
ized the two considerations mentioned in Noerr as the grounds of the decision, 404 U.S.
at 510, and at another point he characterized Noerr rights as "First Amendment rights."
404 U.S. at 514. See generally 2 HANDLER, supra note 1, at 1023-24; Note, 1961 U.
ILL. L. REV. 326 (1961). The Metro Cable court noted Professor Handler's discussion
of this issue. 516 F.2d at 227.
19. 2 HANDLER, supra note 1, at 1023-24.
20. In United States v. Association of American R.R., 4 F.R.D. 510, 527 (D. Neb.
1945) the court held that an individual could solicit government action against competi-
tors with impunity. However, the court was not a good prognosticator since it warned
that the constitutional protection did not extend to acts done in concert. Id. See also P.
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Justice Black was aware of the potential impact of the Noerr rule and to
prevent the total evisceration of the Sherman Act whenever some state
agency happens to be involved, which includes virtually every case today, 21
he expounded the "sham exception" which justifies the application of 'the
Sherman Act where a campaign "ostensibly directed toward influencing
governmental actions, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more
than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor."'2 2  Of particular significance to Metro Cable23 was the Noerr
court's conclusion that neither the sole purpose to destroy truckers as
competition nor the nature of the campaign using vicious, unethical tech-
niques and making misrepresentations negated the doctrine.
The Noerr doctrine was amplified, refined and, in fact, extended in
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington24 where the Court applied
Noerr to concerted action to influence public officials as part of a broader
scheme that violated the Sherman Act. Pennington's significance was even
greater than this since the Court extended Noerr beyond the legislative and
executive areas to independent administrative agencies.25 However, like
Noerr, Pennington involved efforts to influence the government acting in a
non-adjudicatory capacity, and there was substantial debate whether the
doctrine applied to adjudicatory proceedings in courts or before administra-
tive agencies. 26
This question was resolved in California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited27 which held that Noerr - Pennington applied but had to
be adapted to fit the adjudicatory context. The issue in Trucking Unlimited
was the sufficiency- of a complaint alleging that certain -truckers had con-
spired to deter competitors from seeking new or expanded operating rights
by opposing every application to California authorities for those rights
regardless of merit. This resulted in the effective closing of the "machinery
AREEDA, ANTIRUST ANALYSIS § 393 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as AREEDA]. The
answer, of course, is that collective activities are pretty much the norm in lobbying ef-
forts and many effective campaigns would be too dear for an individual concern. See
generally Oppenheim, supra note 15, at 214-15, 233-34.
21. Of course, the federal government makes the states look like pikers in this
respect, raising the ire of persons ranging from William F. Buckley to the editors of
Road & Track magazine. See, e.g., Bond, Detroit's Dilemma, 27 RoAD & TRAcK no. 3,
Nov. 1975, at 68.
22. 365 U.S. at 144.
23. 516 F.2d at 224-25.
24. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
25. 381 U.S. at 669-70. See Oppenheim, supra note 15, at 213.
26. See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438
F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1971); Whitten v. Paddock Pool
Builders, 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). See generally 16F
voN KALiNOWSKI, supra note 12, § 46.04[3]; Note, The Brakes Fail on the Noerr
Doctrine, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 518 (1969).
27. 404 U.S. 508, 511-12, 516 (1972).
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of the agencies and courts" to the plaintiffs. This was perhaps one of the
more open conspiracies in antitrust history since the defendants informed
their competitors what they were up -to and that the plaintiffs could avoid the
problem by abandoning pending applications and refraining from filing
further applications.
It has been argued that Justice Douglas narrowed the scope of Noerr -
Pennington in Trucking Unlimited2s and there certainly is some language
supporting the proposition since this was not one of his more lucid antitrust
decisions. However, a more logical explanation is that the Court simply
recognized that a rule developed in one context cannot necessarily be applied
in toto in another context. 29  Certainly if Justice Douglas had intended to
retreat from Noerr - Pennington, which is unlikely considering his first
amendment record, he probably would have ruled that the doctrine just did
not apply to adjudicatory efforts. This was one of the grounds of the Ninth
Circuit 30 in upholding the complaint. 'Rather, he opted for the Ninth
Circuit's second ground that defendants' conduct was within the sham
exception of Noerr since it was not genuinely aimed at influencing public
officials. Subjecting defendants to antitrust liability where they are acting
solely and directly to harm competitors by foreclosing access to courts and
agencies really is not trampling "upon important First Amendment
values." 31
Justice Douglas recognized that Congress had exercised extreme caution,
perhaps far too much, in regulating political activities and that such caution
was a premise for refusing to extend the Sherman Act to such activities. 32
28. This is not too surprising, considering Justice Stewart's concurring opinion
where he stated: "Today the Court retreats from Noerr, and in the process tramples
upon important First Amendment values." 404 U.S. at 516. Justice Stewart did not
question and in fact agreed with the elevation of Noerr to the constitutional level. Id. at
516-17. Rather, the two concurring Justices felt that the activities of the defendants
were not aimed at invoking the government process but at denying plaintiffs access to the
governmental process. Id. at 518. See generally 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at
410. Compare 2 HANDLER, supra note 1, at 1017-30 with Oppenheim, supra note 15, at
217-24. See also authorities cited supra note 15. The Metro Cable court noted the
debate over the implications of Trucking Unlimited. 516 F.2d at 225 n.6.
29. 404 U.S. at 511-12. See 2 HANDLER, supra note 1, at 1028-29. In Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 782 n.17 (1975), the Supreme Court again
recognized the inappropriateness of automatically applying antitrust concepts originating
in one area in another context.
30. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 432 F.2d 755, 760 (9th
Cir. 1970).
31. 404 U.S. at 516. This was Justice Stewart's observation. See note 28 supra.
As Justice Douglas pointed out, the first amendment does not automatically insulate
conduct violative of valid legislation. 404 U.S. at 514. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire
Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
32. 404 U.S. at 512. Congress, when it does act, prefers to do so directly. Federal
Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (Supp. 1975), 18 U.S.C § 591-617 (Supp.
1975). See generally Ervin, Campaign Practices and the Law: Watergate and Beyond,
23 EMORY L.J. 1 (1974); Hollikan, The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
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However, he then posited that much unethical conduct condoned in the
political arena is condemned in the adjudicatory process either before courts
or administrative agencies. Perjury was one example, bribery another and a
third was a "conspiracy with a licensing authority to eliminate a competitor. '33
This aspect of Trucking Unlimited was significant in Metro Cable and will be
discussed shortly.3 4 Although it is possible to argue, as did Justices Stewart
and Brennan who concurred in the judgment, that there is no difference
between efforts to influence executive and legislative bodies and efforts
directed towards administrative and judicial bodies it seems sounder to
recognize that even in this post-Watergate era the political sphere is more
resilient to "illegal and reprehensible practices" than the judicial sphere. The
cynic who expects the worst from "politicians" might well be dismayed by
improper activities among jurists or attempts to tamper with the adjudicatory
process. Trucking Unlimited is obviously not concerned with a random
effort to -thwart a competitor in a particular law suit or administrative
proceeding but rather a pattern of harassment that constitutes an abuse of
process. When these factors are present then it is reasonable to conclude
that the efforts are a "sham", but when they are absent then efforts to
persuade such agencies or the courts can be characterized as "genuine
efforts" to influence the governmental process and enjoy the same antitrust
immunity as obtains in the political arena.3 5
The Seventh Circuit enjoyed the opportunity to discourse on the
decisions involving governmental action and efforts to influence those actions
from Parker through Trucking Unlimited, but it seemed relieved that it did
not have to resolve the impact of Trucking Unlimited on Noerr since it took
the Court at its word that the latter case was reaffirmed. 36  The Metro
Cable court did acknowledge that Trucking Unlimited might impose antitrust
of 1974: The Constitutionality of Limiting Political Advertising by the Non-Candidate, 3
FLA. ST. L. REV. 266 (1975); Comment, Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions,
52 U. Cm. L. REv. 148 (1974). Campaign regulation is under current attack and the
Supreme Court recently heard arguments in Buckley v. Valeo. See 44 U.S.L.W. 3289
(U.S. Nov. 18, 1975).
33. 404 U.S. at 512-13. Use of a patent obtained by fraud to exclude a competitor
was still another example. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175-77 (1965).
34. 516 F.2d at 226-27. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
35. 2 HANDLER, supra note 1, at 1025. See Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v.
San Francisco Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary Workers, 1973-1 Trade Cas. § 74,513 (N.D.
Cal. 1973).
36. 516 F.2d at 228. See 404 U.S. at 510. The Metro Cable court also cited Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 466, 479-80 (1973) which vacated and
remanded an order in a government suit holding Noerr inapplicable to litigation brought
with an anticompetitive intent. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54,
62 (D. Minn. 1971). The district court, of course, always has the last word on these
matters and promptly reaffirmed its findings and conclusions on the ground that Otter
Tail's litigious efforts were within the Noerr sham as interpreted by Trucking Unlimited,
360 F. Supp. 451 (D. Minn. 1973), afrd mem., 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
ANTITRUST LAW
liability if a governmental official was a co-conspirator in an adjudicatory
setting. However, the pertinent discussion was deemed inapplicable since
there was no question that the Rockford City Council was a legislative body
acting as such in a political setting when considering whether or not to award
one or more cable television franchises or licenses. 3 7  Thus efforts to
influence the Council's decision-making process were clearly within Noerr
without regard to any gloss imparted by Pennington and without regard to
any Trucking Unlimited tarnish. The court recognized that Trucking Unlim-
ited and all its ramifications would apply if the City Council had delegated
its franchising function to an administrative tribunal deciding in an adjudica-
lory setting, but this was not the case in Metro Cable.
As a legislative body the council, and the Mayor as an executive officer
with some legislative duties, operated in a political setting. Decisions could
be made without formal proceedings, which of course is a further reason for
distinguishing adjudicatory proceedings with required formalities, and infor-
mation could be obtained from all sources. This of course includes the
lobbying and ex parte pressures that Noerr recognized as part of the political
process and as such immune from antitrust attack even with their inherent
faults and potential for abuse.3 8  The harm suffered by Metro clearly
flowed from the City Council's decision to grant the franchise to CATV. This
decision was immune as governmental action under Parker, and, therefore,
concerted efforts to induce such action, even with an anticompetitive purpose,
were protected under Noerr since they were aimed at obtaining governmental
action and not, as in Trucking Unlimited, a pretext for inflicting harm on
Metro under the guise of governmental action.
Metro tried several ploys to take the case out of the Noerr doctrine. No
doubt the one most seriously pressed was the naming of the city officials as
co-conspirators. The effort was premised on the reference in Pennington
that the official involved was not claimed to be a co-conspirator,3 9 and
Justice Douglas' observation in Trucking Unlimited that a conspiracy with a
licensing authority might be unlawful in an adjudicatory setting.40  As
noted, the reason the effort failed was the legislative setting, but the Seventh
Circuit also questioned the basis of the ploy even in the adjudicatory setting.
The problem was that the authority cited by Justice Douglas seemed
questionable. He cited Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp.41 for the proposition, but as ,the Metro Cable court pointed out 42 the
"agent" appointed by Canada was not -truly a governmental agency but
37. 516 F.2d at 228-29.
38. Id. See also Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341,
342 (9th Cir. 1969).
39. 381 U.S. at 671.
40. 404 U.S. at 513.
41. 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1961).
42. 516 F.2d at 229. See 370 U.S. at 695.
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rather was a subsidiary of the principal actor in the conspiracy acting at the
direction and on behalf of its parent. 'Furthermore, the Pennington court had
distinguished Continental Ore as "dissimilar to both Noerr and the present
case" 43 and it certainly did not involve the adjudicatory context for which it
was cited.
Another decision cited by Justice Douglas was Harman v. Valley Na-
tional Bank44 where the Ninth Circuit held it was error to dismiss a complaint
alleging that defendants had conspired with the Arizona Attorney General to
file an unfounded but successful suit to appoint a receiver for a savings and
loan institution as part of a scheme to monopolize that industry. The
decision was not particularly well reasoned and the court was as much
concerned with not deciding antitrust cases on motions to dismiss as it was in
carving out an exception to Noerr. However it did distinguish Noerr on the
grounds that the effort was part of a larger scheme in restraint of trade and
the official in question was an alleged co-conspirator. The first ground did
not survive the subsequent Pennington decision, and the second ground
apparently was not enough to sustain the case since the Ninth Circuit
declined to follow Harman in Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State
Disposal Co.45 Sun Valley was similar to Metro Cable since it involved one
competitor successfully preventing another from obtaining a trash disposal
franchise. To be sure Sun Valley involved the jurisdictional reach of the
Sherman Act, and the concurring judge gave more emphasis to the passage
in Pennington that the public official was not claimed to be a co-conspirator.
Although it makes arguable sense to limit the Noerr - Pennington defense
where public officials are "conspiring", to do so would seriously erode the
doctrine since it is likely that any effort to obtain governmental action,
such as the awarding of a franchise, will find at least one proponent on the
governmental body. 46
43. 381 U.s. at 671.
44. 449 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964). See also Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Larson,
257 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 879 (1958). The Harman Court
held it was improper to dismiss a Sherman Act complaint for failure to state a claim even
though it was unwilling to explicitly hold a triable claim had been alleged. However,
there might have been "something there" and a motion for a more particular statement
would have been more appropriate than the motion to dismiss. See generally 16F voN
KALINOWSKI, supra note 12, §§ 46.03, .04[3].
45. 420 F.2d 341, 342, 343 (9th Cir. 1969). Summary judgment for the plaintiff
was affirmed even though, as in Metro Cable, government officials participated in the
scheme and misrepresentations were utilized to obtain the franchise. The court was
unwilling to turn what might be a violation of local law into a federal case by a
conspiracy allegation.
46. 516 F.2d at 230. The court acknowledged that distinguishing Noerr because of
a "governmental co-conspirator" would abrogate the doctrine for all intents and purposes
since as a practical matter legislative action cannot be induced unless members are
influenced to take the lead. Furthermore, nothing in Noerr suggested Congress intended
the Sherman Act to apply if a legislator supported the efforts but not if somehow
legislative action could be induced without such support.
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Metro Cable also discussed and distinguished Israel v. Baxter Labora-
tories, Inc.47 by emphasizing its quasi-adjudicative nature rather than its
legislative setting. The Israel court had viewed the complaint as alleging
that the defendants' real purposes were to preclude, not induce, governmental
action thus bringing the case within the Trucking Unlimited sham excep-
tion.4 8 Metro argued the denial of access issue by emphasizing the City
Council's refusal to hold hearings on its applications. Again it was an
argument with some basis,, but the court was not persuaded since the
defendants were attempting to secure favorable action rather than precluding
Metro from seeking governmental action. Thus Metro Cable was not within
the sham exception as adapted in Trucking Unlimited even if the process
proposed by the City Council could be deemed adjudicatory rather than
legislative. 4
9
The court then discussed Trucking Unlimited as if it did not involve the
sham exception but stood for the proposition that denial of access to a
governmental body is actionable. Even then Metro failed since access to a
highly structured adjudicatory process can be shut off easily while this is not
true with the more free-wheeling legislative context. Metro was just as free
to informally influence members of the City Council as were the defendants.
There was no allegation that defendants attempted to keep Metro from
communicating with governmental officials, and FCC Regulations adopted
long after its first application was denied only required a record to support
the granting of a municipal CATV franchise and did not require that
applicants be given hearings.
Other arguments were to no avail. The supposed substantial campaign
contribution turned out to be minimal, and in any event Noerr itself involved
campaign support by both sides of the dispute. Although a specific cam-
paign law might regulate such activities the court was convinced that Congress
clearly did not intend the Sherman Act to serve this function.50 Misrepre-
sentations made by the defendants were irrelevant since Noerr involved simi-
lar activity. 51 A false certificate allegedly filed with the FCC was also
irrelevant since no action of that agency affected Metro and the refusal by
47. 466 F.2d 272, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Semke v. Enid Automobile
Dealers Ass'n., 456 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1972).
48. See generally 16F VON KALiIoWSKi, supra note 12, §§ 46.04[1], [3].
49. 516 F.2d at 231-32. See Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco
Joint Bd. of Culinary Workers, 1973-1 Trade Cas. § 74, 513 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
50. Id. at 230-31. See note 11 supra and accompanying text; note 32 supra.
There was considerable discussion of the campaign activities of both groups in the
district court's opinion in Noerr. 155 F. Supp. 768, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1957). Metro Cable
was not sanctioning unethical political activities, needless to say, but its reference to
congressional intent demonstrates that it still considers Noerr a case of statutory
construction notwithstanding Justice Douglas' elevation of the doctrine.
51. 516 F.2d at 231. See 365 U.S. at 140-42. See also Sun Valley Disposal Co. v.
Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969). See generally 2 HANDLER,
supra note 1, at 1023-24.
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the City Council to grant Metro authority to install cables on city utility poles
was as much a legislative decision as the -franchise issue and hence efforts to
influence were immune. 52
This decision appears to reach a reasonable and proper result. Accept-
ing the premise of Noerr the only result that could obtain is that defendants'
actions were immune. The context was clearly political and CATV was
clearly and genuinely trying to obtain a favored status even if it was not
displeased that Metro was shut out of the Rockford cable market. Even if
Trucking Unlimited eroded Noerr by making actionable a foreclosure of
access to a governmental body it is difficult to see how Metro could be
benefitted. CATV could not really and truly foreclose Metro since contact
with legislative bodies is usually, perhaps too much so, informal and Metro
was as free as CATV to bend -the will of -the Council.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The year 1975 can perhaps be called the year of the "jurisdictional
inquiry" with Supreme Court decisions such as Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,53 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,5 4 and United States v. American
Bldg. Maintenance Indus.5 5 raising issues as to whether the constitutionally
imposed interstate commerce requirement for violating the antitrust laws was
satisfied. The Seventh Circuit was also called upon to resolve this issue in
United States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc.56 where the court affirmed the jury
trial conviction of two contractors indicted under section 1 of the Sherman
Act for combining and conspiring to submit collusive, noncompetitive and
rigged bids for a sewer project in East St. Louis, Illinois, by rejecting the
three issues raised by defendants: (1) Whether there was sufficient evidence
to prove the jurisdictional commerce requirement; (2) whether there was
sufficient evidence to prove the conspiracy to rig bids; and (3) whether the
trial court erred in admitting certain evidence.
The key issue was whether the facts were sufficient to satisfy the
"particularized judicial determination" necessary to establish the requisite
nexus to interstate commerce.5 7  The key facts were that certain of the
supplies used by defendants were manufactured without the state of Illinois
even though some were purchased from an Illinois company; and while the
cost of these supplies and materials was under $10,000, the total cost of the
52. 516 F.2d at 232.
53. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
54. 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
55. 422 U.S. 271 (1975).
56. 509 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3223 (U.S. Oct. 14,
1975).
57. 509 F.2d at 1258, citing Gulf Oil Co. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974)
and Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n., 472 F.2d 517, 526-27 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
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project, paid with federal funds supplied by the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was approximately $60,000.5
Thus the court was faced with a situation where some interstate
commerce was clearly involved but the agreement, if any, was a local
arrangement between two competitors relating to a local construction project.
The court -framed the issue as whether the jurisdictional requirement of the
Sherman Act and the elements of an unlawful restraint of trade could be
satisfied separately or whether the jurisdiction element requires that the
restraint be upon interstate commerce. The former test is satisfied where
there is a showing of some connection between interstate commerce and the
conduct regardless of whether the conduct restrained that commerce. But
the alternative approach requires a showing that the conduct restrained was
interstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged ,that there is
authority supporting both propositions, but did not have to resolve the issue
since it was satisfied the evidence supported a finding of jurisdiction under
either approach. 9 It seems somewhat anomalous that in 1975 there are still
some unresolved questions as to the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act
but such is the case. Perhaps this is because, as the Ernest court observed,
the single cryptic phrase "restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states" defines both the jurisdictional scope and the type of conduct prohibit-
ed. 60
Ernest reflects an inclination towards the position that no actual adverse
impact on interstate commerce need be shown and .that it suffices if
defendants' conduct demonstrates enough relationship to interstate commerce
to be within the regulatory powers of Congress. This is the approach taken
by -the Ninth Circuit in several recent cases including In re Western Liquid
Asphalt Cases6 ' that ultimately resulted in the Supreme Court's decision in
Gulf Oil Co. v. Copp Paving Co. 62 on the jurisdictional scope of the Clayton
and Robinson-Patman Acts. 63 As far as the Sherman Act was concerned
58. 509 F.2d at 1258.
59. Id. at 1260.
60. Id. at 1258. See also A. Cherney Disposal Co. v. Chicago & Suburban Refuse
Disposal Ass'n., 484 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974);
Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n. 472 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1972). See generally
1955 Report, supra note 13, at 64; 16 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 12, § 5.01; Eiger, The
Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Litigation, 25 FED. B.J. 282 (1965); Note,
Portrait of the Sherman Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 323
(1974). Section 1 is set out in note 12 supra.
61. 487 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1973).
62. 419 U.S. 186 (1974), rev'g in part In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487
F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1973).
63. The suit alleged violations of section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), and sections 3 and 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1970) as well as a violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The grant of certiorari was limited to the
Robinson-Patman and Clayton Act issues. 415 U.S. 988 (1974). The Court construed
the facially narrow language of these two Acts as limiting jurisdiction to "persons or
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the Ninth Circuit held that the jurisdictional requirement was met because
the production of asphaltic concrete in California for building interstate
highways "rendered the producers 'instrumentalities' of interstate commerce
and placed them 'in' that commerce as a matter of law."' 64 Since the Liquid
Asphalt court found the defendants in commerce there was no need to
decide if there was any actual restraint on commerce. The Seventh Circuit
noted that this approach widened the Sherman Act's reach but that it had
support in those Supreme Court decisions emphasizing Congress' intent to
exercise the full extent of its constitutional authority in adopting the Sherman
Act.6 5 The court further posited that this approach is particularly appropri-
ate in cases involving per se violations of the Sherman Act where, as with
price fixing and bid rigging, there is no need to show effects to establish the
substantive offense. If there is no need for an "elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm [the practices] have caused or the business excuse for their
use" 66 there is no need to ascertain actual injury in determining whether the
Act had been violated.
As Professor Areeda observes in his Antitrust Analysis,67 however,
some courts require some showing that commerce itself is effected by the
challenged actions. Although these courts might not appreciate the rationale
of the per se doctrine, Professor Areeda does acknowledge that some
Supreme Court language supports the proposition since the "interstate conse-
quences" of a course of conduct are mentioned even in the most expansive of
decisions. 68  For example, Justice Jackson's marvelous phrase in United
States v. Women's Sportswear Manufacturers Association"9 that, "if it is
activities within the flow of interstate commerce the practical, economic continuity in the
generation of goods and services for interstate markets and their transport and distribu-
tion to the consumer." 419 U.S. at 186. See generally 16C vON KALiNowsK, supra
note 12, §§ 26.0112], 26.02.
64. 487 F.2d at 204. The Ninth Circuit held that jurisdiction attached to the
Robinson-Patman Act and Clayton Act claims because they were intended to supplement
the Sherman Act. Justice Douglas in his Copp dissent posited that the majority's finding
that the questioned activities were not sufficiently in commerce for Robinson-Patman
Act and Clayton Act purposes might adversely effect the Sherman Act ruling. 419 U.S.
at 208 n.6.
65. Gulf Oil Co. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 201 (1974); United States v.
Frankfort Distilleries Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533, 557-59 (1944); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 495 (1940). The Seventh Circuit recently considered Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion in A. Cherny Disposal Co. v. Chicago & Suburban Refuse Disposal Ass'n, 484
F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1973), where it reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. See generally 16 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 12, § 5.01.
66. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
67. AREEDA, supra note 20, §§ 182-83 at 121 & nn. 427-30.
68. Id. Areeda cites the Cherney case for the proposition that the jurisdictional
issue must be determined after trial where the issue was whether the alleged violation
had too tenuous a relationship with interstate commerce. See note 76 infra.
69. 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949). The Ernest court noted that the Supreme Court
had never squarely decided whether a business with out of state activities violates the
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interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation which applies the squeeze", makes understandable the requirement
of proving the interstate pinch.70 The Ernest court also found "suggestions"
that there must be a showing of an adverse effect on commerce to satisfy the
jurisdictional inquiry in earlier decisions such as United States v. Employing
Plasterers Association7' and Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co.,1 2 and even in Copp Paving.73 However none of these
decisions were considered definitive statements on the issue.
One lower court opinion taking the approach that the Ernest court
discussed was the Ninth Circuit's decision in Page v. Work,74 which seems
inconsistent with later cases such as Liquid Asphalt but which continues to
be cited. Page involved a conspiracy, or alleged conspiracy, to eliminate
competition in legal advertising in Los Angeles county. The court concluded
that the jurisdictional element was not satisfied because the restraints were
on a purely local level and were directed towards the local intrastate market.
The fact that the newspapers bought newsprint from without California,
carried some national news and advertising and had non-California subscri-
bers did not suffice. Thus Page took a restrictive view of the jurisdictional
element emphasizing the locus of the restraint. Other lower courts have
found jurisdiction to be absent where interstate activities were alleged but
there was no showing that the restraint operated on commerce.7 5 Interest-
ingly, one case not cited was the Seventh Circuit's own decision in United
States v. Starlite Drive-In, Inc.76 affirming a dismissal of a drive-in movie
Sherman Act by engaging in a local conspiracy without effect on interstate commerce but
acknowledged dicta suggesting that an interstate restraint is required for jurisdiction. 509
F.2d at 1260. See generally 16 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 12, § 5.01[1], [3]-[4].
70. AREEDA, supra note 20, at 121 n.428. Compare Brett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n. 461 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972) and Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment
Co., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969) with Marston v. Ann Arbor Property Mgmt.
Ass'n., 422 F.2d 836 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970). See generally 16
VON KALNoWSKI, supra note 12, § 5.01[4].
71. 347 U.S. 186, 188 (1954).
72. 334 U.S. 219, 234, 238-39 (1948).
73. 419 U.S. at 195.
74. 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961).
75. See, e.g., Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469
F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1972); Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d
Cir. 1964); Elizabeth Hosp. Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 884 (1959); Saint Anthony Minneapolis, Inc. v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 316 F.
Supp. 1045 (D. Minn. 1970). See generally 16 voN KALINowSKI, supra note 12, §
5.01[4].
76. 204 F.2d 419, 421 (7th Cir. 1953). See also Gordon v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
330 F.2d 103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964); Evanston Cab Co. v. City of
Chicago, 325 F.2d 907 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964); cases cited in
AREEDA, supra note 20, at 122 n.43 1. Professor Areeda characterized these courts as not
appreciating the rationale of the per se rules and opined as follows:
If certain conduct be held within the antitrust ban because of its potential for
harm, regardless of demonstrated harm in any particular case, is it inconsistent
simultaneously to require proof of effects to satisfy the statute's jurisdictional
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admission price-fixing suit where the restraint on the interstate flow of movie
films was "speculative and conjectural."
Perhaps cases like Starlite and Page can be reconciled with the more
expansive decisions by deemphasizing the lack of noticeable effect on
commerce and emphasizing that the restraints might just fall within the
ancient doctrine de minimis non curat lex. Penalties for Sherman Act
violations are severe, with treble damage relief to persons injured in their
business or property by the activities or, as in Ernest, criminal sanctions. It
certainly does not seem improper to allow some leeway in enforcing legisla-
tion like the Sherman Act and perhaps it is more appropriate to recognize
clearly that there might well be activities technically and literally falling
within Congress' proscriptions that really do not warrant the full sanctions. 77
However, as noted, the Seventh Circuit did not have to decide which
test to apply since both were satisfied. 78  The purchase of the out of state
materials for use on a contract that had been obtained through bid rigging
satisfied the broader test, particularly since a per se violation was involved
and the amount of commerce is unimportant in such cases. Under the
alternative approach, jurisdiction obtained since the evidence supported the
inference that defendants' activities had the requisite restraining effect even
if the price of the materials purchased in interstate commerce was not
affected by the bid rigging. The court concluded the restraint potentially
reduced competition in supplies in commerce since without genuine competi-
tive bidding there was no incentive for either defendant to seek competitive
prices from material suppliers to get the lowest bid. Perhaps an even more
significant restraint was the impact of the bid rigging on the cost of the
project paid with HUD funds that were transferred in interstate commerce.
A related effect was that HUD's financial "pie" is large but not unlimited
and overcharging on a project in East St. Louis means less money available
test? The Supreme Court has, in effect, so ruled by assuming an interstate
impact.
AREEDA, supra note 20, at 122 n.431 (citation omitted). See also note 68 infra.
77. See, e.g., Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir.
1964); Evanston Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 325 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1964); Sandidge v.
Rogers, 256 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1958); Riggall v. Washington County Med. Soc'y, 249
F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957). Von Kalinowski posits that many courts adopting a de
minimus test do not indicate whether they are holding that such effect is insufficient to
create jurisdiction or that the effect was not substantial enough to be deemed unreasona-
ble and simply cite Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 331
U.S. 219 (1948). See 16 VoN KALINows, supra note 12, § 5.0112] at 5-38 n.43. See
also Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898); Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S.
604 (1898).
78. 509 F.2d at 1260-61. In considering the broad jurisdictional approach that
looks to the relationship to commerce to satisfy the constitutional requirement the court
noted that the quantity of commerce is not important where a per se offense is involved,
citing United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1956) and
United States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584, 588 (8th Cir. 1970).
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for other projects which in turn reduces the amount of goods shipped in
commerce.
There is certainly no infirmity in those propositions subsequent to
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar79 where the Supreme Court held the Sherman
Act commerce requirement satisfied in an attack on lawyers' minimum fee
schedules where funds for home purchasers in Virginia came from without
the state and HUD and the Veterans Administration guaranteed the mort-
gages. In Goldfarb the Court noted the restraints were on commerce but this
does not indicate a Supreme Court tilt towards the more restrictive view in
that the Fourth Circuit's decision in Goldfarb had denied any impact on
interstate commerce because of the local nature of bar activities.
The defendants also argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the conviction."0 Needless to say the court was not inclined to disturb the
jury verdict since the jury had the chance to weigh the evidence and
determine the credibility of witnesses and there was substantial evidence to
support it. Criminal conspiracies do not have to be proved by direct
evidence and circumstantial evidence will suffice. Of course, the evidence
must be sufficient to convince the jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
but this does not mean every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt need be
excluded. 8' The court nevertheless reviewed the evidence and concluded
that the bid of one defendant, Modern Asphalt, was not serious but was
submitted to give the appearance of competitive bidding. Particularly
significant was the altering of a price on Modem's bid form to a figure
substantially higher than Ernest's 'bid. Other damning evidence included the
preparing of Modem's bid on the morning it was due by an employee
working at home who had neither inspected the work site nor contacted
suppliers; Modem was so over-committed on construction jobs that it could
not have obtained a performance bond; and it was so sure that it would not
get the job that its checking account did not have sufficient funds to cover
the check submitted with the bid. The opportunity to conspire was satisfied
by showing that both defendants had worked together on another project
when the bids were submitted. 2
Finally, appellants argued that the evidence concerning the insufficient
funds was improperly admitted as irrelevant and improper rebuttal testimony
and impeachment on a collateral matter. However, the court concluded this
79. 421 U.S. 773, 780-81 (1975).
80. 509 F.2d at 1261-62.
81. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Manton,
107 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1938) (conspiracy may be inferred from a "development and
collocation of circumstances"); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954)
(not all hypotheses other than guilt need be excluded provided jury is convinced of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.) The Ernest court relied on these cases. 509 F.2d at 1261.
See also United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). See generally 16
voN KnuNowsKx, supra note 12, § 6.01[3].
82. 509 F.2d at 1262.
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evidence was admitted not to impeach a witness but rather to contradict
Modern's evidence that its bid was serious even though the check submitted
was not certified as required by the bid specifications. The evidence was
properly introduced on rebuttal to "explain, repel, counteract or disprove"88
Modern's evidence of a serious bid.
MARKET DEFINITION
A final Seventh Circuit decision of antitrust interest is Cass Student
Advertising, Inc. v. National Educational Advertising Service, Inc.,8 4 involv-
ing Sherman Act sections 1 and 2. The primary thrust of the complaint was
that NEAS exercised monopoly power in the market "for representing
college newspapers throughout the United States in the placement of national
advertising"85 in violation of section 2. Cass also charged an attempt to
monopolize in violation of section 2 and that section 1 was violated by
NEAS's exclusive agreements with college newspapers and a conspiracy
among NEAS and some newspapers to restrain plaintiff's business. The
district court86 held that the relevant line of commerce for testing defend-
ant's market power for section 2 purposes was not the market for represent-
ing college newspapers but the broader market encompassing all modes of
competition for presenting national advertising to college students and the
representatives of those media. Since Cass had not shown NEAS possessed
monopoly power in that market the district court concluded there was no
Sherman Act violation. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the
market determination was erroneous.8 7
Ascertaining an appropriate market to judge the economic power of the
defendant is of course -the threshold inquiry in any monopoly case. The
"market" is not an abstraction but rather a pragmatic determination of an
83. 509 F.2d at 1262-63. The court cited United States v. Mallis, 467 F.2d 567,
569 (3d Cir. 1972) and United States v. Crowe, 188 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1951).
84. 516 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3295 (U.S. Nov. 18,
1975).
85. 516 F.2d at 1093. Section 2 of the Sherman Act is set out in pertinent part at
note 13 supra and section 1 is set out in pertinent part at note 12 supra.
86. 374 F. Supp. 796, 803 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
87. 516 F.2d at 1093. The Cass court did not set aside the findings of the district
court under the clearly erroneous standard of rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, but rather concluded the lower court had misapplied the appropriate legal
standards. See United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 666 (1974);
Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1974). (Mullis was
discussed in the 1974 Chicago-Kent Seventh Circuit Review. See Hermann, Antitrust
Law, 51 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 288 (1974)). However, as a general proposition, the
definition of a relevant market for antitrust purposes is essentially a question of fact for
the trial court and the findings will not be disturbed unless "clearly erroneous." See
International Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 245 (1959). See also
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). See generally
1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 48-49; 16N VON KALINOwSKI, supra note 12, §
117.01[3].
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area of effective competition s" involving both a product or service element
and a geographic element. The former means finding what products or
services vie for the consumer's dollar and the latter means finding the locale
where defendant and others effectively compete. This can range from one
locality to the nation; and it was concededly national in Cass.8 9 Rather the
lower court erred in the product market determination by not recognizing
that representing college newspapers in placing national advertising could be
an appropriate submarket within a broader market category including other
advertising media.
The Seventh Circuit's inquiry started, as it should have, with United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,90 the "cellophane" case, where the
Court propounded the "reasonable interchangeability" test defining the
market in terms of practical market alternatives or substitutes. In other
words, a determination was required as to what other product or service
reasonably could be used in lieu of defendant's product or service. The test
was refined in such monopoly cases as United States v. Grinnell Corp.91 and
International Boxing :Club, Inc. v. United States9 2 and such merger cases as
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States93 and United States v. The' Connecticut
National Bank94 where the concept of distinct submarkets for antitrust
purposes was recognized. The determination of submarkets is also a
practical exercise, and in the words of Brown Shoe quoted in Cass, they
"may be determined by examining such practical indicia as industry or
88. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See also' United
States v. The Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United States v. Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336
(1962); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); International
Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States, 385 U.S. 242 (1959); United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1953), affd. per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See generally
2 HANDLER, supra note 1, at 1049-51; 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 48-52; 16
VON KALnowsKI, supra note 12, § 8.02[2].
89. 516 F.2d at 1096. See Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S.
320, 327 (1961). A national market is appropriate if the business in question is
nationwide in scope. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966). See
also American Football League v. National Football League, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir.
1963); Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd
on other grounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967). See generally 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note
1, at 51-52; 16 VON KALINOWSKJ, supra note 12, § 8.02[2][b].
90. 351 U.S. 377 (1956). See generally 1 HANDLER, supra note 1, at 228-33; 16
VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 12, § 8.02[2][a].
91. 384 U.S. 563 (1966). See generally 2 HANDLER, supra note 1, at 1050-51; 16
VON KALINOWSK, supra note 12, § 8.02[2][a].
92. 358 U.S. 242 (1959). See generally 16 VON KALINOWsKI, supra note 12, §
8.02[21[a].
93. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). Although the operational language of section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) is "line of commerce" and section 2 is phrased in
terms of a "part of commerce" the Court in Grinnell concluded there was "no reason to
differentiate" between the two. 384 U.S. at 573. See generallyjl6, 16B VON KAUNOW-
sKi, supra note 12, §§ 8.02[3], 18.02-.04.
94. 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
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public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the
product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities,
distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized
vendors." 95
Submarket definitions often work to the disadvantage of defend-
ants. If cellophane had been considered a submarket among "flexible wrap-
ping materials", du Pont no doubt would have lost the case with its 75 per-
cent market share. In Grinnell the Court rejected defendants' efforts to
have protective services, other than the central station variety it controlled,
included in the market definition. Although other services existed, for many
customers only the central station type would suffice making it an appropri-
ate submarket. International Boxing recognized that championship boxing
contests were unique because of the public interest even among people who
otherwise have no interest, or even a disinterest, in boxing and would not
attend non-championship fights. However, on occasion the process works to
the defendant's advantage. In Connecticut National the Court accepted the
proposition that savings banks and commercial banks were fiercely competi-
tive as to certain services, but concluded the businesses were sufficiently
distinct to warrant separate treatment and that commercial banks were a
distinct line of commerce.98
The concept of submarkets in appropriate cases has also been recog-
nized in Seventh Circuit decisions cited in Cass. In L.G. Balfour v. FTC97
the court reasoned that college students buying fraternity emblematic jewelry
were apart from purchasers of other types of emblematic jewelry and their
nature required the market be so defined. Particularly signficant to the Cass
court was the observation in Balfour, quoting from United States v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp.,98 that the characteristics of buyers as well as sellers is
important in the market definition process. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in
Avnet, Inc. v. FTC99 rejected a market including sales of used and rebuilt
automotive parts priced substantially below comparable new items because
there was no price interaction between the two lines. Sales to certain types
of rebuilders also were excluded because their operations differed significant-
ly from the typical buyer in the overall market.
95. 516 F.2d at 1094, quoting 370 U.S. at 325.
96. 418 U.S. at 660-66. The decision on the relevant product market was unani-
mous, but the Court split 5 to 4 on the issue of the relevant geographic market. Id. at
673.
97. 442 F.2d 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1971). See also Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Quest, Inc.,
431 F.2d 261, (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 956 (1971).
98. 168 F. Supp. 576, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Bethlehem was decided before Brown
Shoe. The court concluded that there was a broad iron and steel line of commerce with
distinct submarkets for ten specific products. See also cases cited in 1975 Developments,
supra note 12, at 65 n.10.
99. 511 F.2d 70, 77-79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3183 (U.S. Oct. 7,
1975).
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Applying the "teachings" of these cases, the Cass court reversed and
remanded for the lower court to determine if the service of representing
college newspapers in placing national advertising was a distinct submarket
for purposes of section 2 even though college students are clearly exposed to
national advertising in various media. Cass and NEAS were the only
serious contenders in this business with NEAS being by far the largest,
claiming to represent over 1000 college newspapers reaching about 85
percent of the 8,500,000-person college market. 100 Most all of NEAS'
agreements with the newspapers made it the exclusive representative which,
needless to say, made it difficult for Cass to expand from a local operation
representing college and high school papers in the Chicago area to a
nationwide operation. Apparently NEAS had enjoyed this "monopolistic"
position for a number of years, but this, in and of itself, could not establish
that NEAS monopolized commerce in violation of section 2. The offense is
not the mere existence of monopoly power in a relevant market but the
existence of monopoly power coupled with an element of deliberateness in
obtaining or maintaining that status.10 1 Monopoly power for section 2
purposes is most commonly defined as the power to raise prices and exclude
competitors.' 0 2  Basically the issue on remand would be whether the
100. 516 F.2d at 1096. NEAS had 894 written contracts with college newspapers,
making it their exclusive representative, about eight written non-exclusive contracts and
about 203 oral non-exclusive understandings. NEAS was both boastful and modest; the
Cass court noted it overestimated the total number of college students and hence
appeared to reach about 87 percent of them. Id. at 1096 n.5.
101. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter referred
to as Alcoa], United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953). See generally 1955 Report, supra note 13, at 43, 44-46; 1975 DEVELOPMENTS,
supra note 1, at 47-48, 55-56; 16 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 12, §§ 8.01, .02[1l], [4].
Judge Hand in Alcoa suggested that a company charged with monopolization might
successfully defend on the ground that the monopoly power was innocently acquired, i.e.
that it was "thrust upon" the defendant. 148 F.2d at 429. See 16A VON KALINOWSKI,
supra note 12, § 9.03[1]. Although this is true in theory and in fact in many cases, it
does not take a confirmed cynic to suspect that the possessor of such power over a long
period of time is not completely innocent. In fact, Judge Wyzanski in Grinnell
questioned the vitality of the defense and posited that dominance in a market established
a rebuttable presumption that the defendant has monopolized. However, the Supreme
Court did not consider this point since it was satisfied that Grinnell had violated section
2 on traditional grounds. 236 F. Supp. 244, 248 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd in part and
remanded, 384 U.S. 563, 576 n.7. (1966). See generally 1955 Report, supra note 13, at
56-60; 1975 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 56-59; 16 VON KALINowsKI, supra note
12, § 8.02[4]; 1 HANDLER, supra note 1, 230-31.
102. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946). See also
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427-28 (2d Cir. 1945). The concept
was recognized as early as the 1911 decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 58 (1911). See generally 1955 REPORT, supra note 13, at 49-50; 1975 DEVELOP-
MENTS, supra note 1, at 53-55; 16 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 12, § 8.02[3]. The most
common determinent of monopoly power is the market share of the defendant in the
relevant market. In Alcoa, Judge Hand opined that a 90 percent share sufficed, 60 or 64
percent was questionable and 33 percent was insufficent. 148 F.2d at 424. The Court
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exclusive contracts precluding the newspapers from accepting advertising
from any other representative, but not from the advertiser or its agency
directly, supplied the element of deliberateness. There is little doubt but
that NEAS' 85 percent share of the "college student" market would satisfy
the monopoly or market power element of the offense' 0 3 as long as the
district court concluded on remand, as is almost certain to be the case, that
this is an appropriate submarket.
On the relevant market issue the trial court had found the college
students constituted one third of the population in the 18 to 24 age bracket
comprising a distinct market for goods and services apart from their compa-
triots who do not attend college. It also recognized that college newspapers
constituted a distinct communications medium because a great percentage of
college students read them even though local commercial papers may reach
as many. However, it was unwilling to take the next logical step and
conclude that college newspapers were a distinct submarket for section 2.
The problem was that the lower court viewed the case as involving only the
"single service" of publicizing a product or service in the college market and
the newspapers have considerable competition in this respect.10 4  Apparent-
ly the court misunderstood the signficance of the comment in Balfour on
"buyers"' 03 and overemphasized the attitude of national advertisers who
acknowledge that college newspapers have such competition. Since there
was no showing that NEAS had significant power in this market there was no
basis for action.106
The problem with this approach was that it failed to recognize that Cass
and NEAS act primarily as middlemen furnishing services to the sellers, the
college newspapers, as well as the buyers, the national advertisers. This is
true even though the advertisers are the ultimate purchasers in buying
advertising space. In fact, without enterprises such as Cass or NEAS it
would not be economically feasible for either the newspapers or the advertis-
in du Pont assumed that a 75 percent market share would have been sufficient to satisfy
this element. 351 U.S. at 391. Judge Wyzanski's Grinnell monopolization presumption
would come into play at an 85 percent market share. 236 F. Supp. 244, 257 (D.R.I.
1964), aff'd in part and remanded, 384 U.S. 563 (1966). A 70 percent market share
would appear to be about the minimum as a general rule. Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger
Co., 402 F.2d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969). However,
smaller shares will or might be sufficient if other factors, such as the marginal nature of
the remaining competitors, are present, see 16 voN KALINOWSKI, supra note 12, § 8.02[3]
[c], or where there had been actual exercise of the power. See American Tobacco Co.
v. United States, supra; 16 voN KALINowsKI, supra note 12, § 8.02[3][a].
103. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
See also authorities cited supra note 101.
104. 516 F.2d at 1097. See 374 F. Supp. at 801-02.
105. 516 F.2d at 1097. See 374 F. Supp. at 801 n.9, citing L. G. Balfour v. F.T.C.,
442 F.2d at 11, which in turn quoted United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F.
Supp. at 592.
106. 374 F. Supp. at 803.
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ers to seek out each other on a one-to-one basis, 1" 7 and the newspapers
would be in difficult straits without representatives who could approach
advertisers with the opportunity to place ads in a significant number of
journals. Viewed from the vantage point of the newspapers, a representa-
tive could have a "stranglehold" and such appeared to be the case with
NEAS. s08 Thus without disturbing the findings on the relevant market as
viewed from the position of the advertisers, the Seventh Circuit could
conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to consider the
newspapers viewpoint. If the newspapers were viewed as buyers of NEAS'
services, then the Balfour comment would be satisfied. The conclusion that
the newspapers bought NEAS' services was buttressed by the fact that the
newspapers paid NEAS commissions.' 0 9
Although du Pont and Brown Shoe require that the products or services
reasonably be interchangeable, this did not justify the conclusion that the
significant alternatives to college newspapers available to national advertisers
justified a broad product market definition. Rather the Seventh Circuit
applied the Brown Shoe tests or indicia and concluded, rightly so, that the
relevant submarket was the market for representing college newspapers in
the placement of national advertising. One indicium is whether the submarket
has "specialized vendors" and this was clearly so since representatives of
commercial newspapers did not represent college papers and NEAS did not
represent commercial papers. Further, the newspapers were distinct custom-
ers since only those national advertisers selling goods or services appealing to
the 18-24 year old college student would be interested in the services of
NEAS or Cass." x0
Another Brown Shoe indicium that was satisfied was industry or public
recognition of a submarket as a distinct entity and here NEAS might have
been "hoist by its own petard""' since it urged in its business operations
that college newspapers are the most reliable and effective medium to reach
.students. In fact NEAS clearly considered the newspapers as an entity since
its exclusive contracts were with them and not the advertisers. This was
significant since the views of the dominant entity in a market are always
107. 516 F.2d at 1097-98. See 374 F. Supp. at 797-98. The businesses of Cass and
NEAS had two aspects. First, they would seek authority to represent the newspapers to
national advertisers and once authorized they would become advertising space sales
representatives for the college papers. The representatives then bill the advertisers an
amount due the various college newspapers in which advertising has been placed. They
deduct their commissions before turning the amount over to the papers. Since advertis-
ers want the most exposure for their advertising dollars the newspaper representative
with the most client newspapers would receive the greatest amount of business.
108. 516 F.2d at 1099. The Seventh Circuit referred to the "esteemed district
judge" and one might wonder if "esteemed" or "learned" trial judges are ever affirmed.
109. 516 F.2d at 1098. See 374 F. Supp. at 797-98.
110. 516 F.2d at 1098-1100.
111. Hamlet, Act Il, Scene IV, line 206. See 516 F.2d at 1096, 374 F. Supp. at
801.
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important in defining the product market for section 2 purposes.1 1 2  Fur-
thermore the evidence indicated that the advertisers themselves regarded the
representation of college newspapers as a distinct business. Another area
where NEAS perhaps did itself in was when it raised its commission charges
and told the newspapers that they in turn could raise their prices to offset the
increase without fear of loss of revenue. This demonstrated an insensitivity
to price changes that further supported the conclusion that college newspa-
pers were a distinct market. 11
Since the Seventh Circuit rejected the district court's view that the sole
buyers of the services were the advertisers, it distinguished Kansas City Star
Co. v. United States" 4 and Huron Valley Publishing Co. v. Booth News-
papers, Inc." 5 on the ground that they involved monopolies of adver-
tising media in local markets rather than a monopoly in a service market,
such as the service of sales representatives for college newspapers. The court
appears to be correct on this point and in fact its entire treatment of Cass
seems an eminently sensible and correct application of the teaching of Brown
Shoe and other cases recognizing that it is appropriate to carve out a portion
of a large market that has distinct attributes in order to test the degree of
market power possessed by a defendant. In this case the college newspaper
representative business with only two contenders seems particularly appropri-
ate.116
112. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1945).
113. 516 F.2d at 1100. See 374 F. Supp. at 802. See generally 16 VON KALINOWKI,
supra note 12, § 8.02[2].
114. 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
115. 336 F. Supp. 659. (E.D. Mich. 1972).
116. Although the point was raised by Cass, the Seventh Circuit declined to consider
whether the exclusive agreements and alleged anticompetitive activities were independent
violations of section 1 because the issue would again be before the trial court on remand.
516 F.2d at 1100.
